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THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES OF
THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR
ORGANIZATION
Ernest A. Landy*
People must become aware that economic tensions
within countries and in the relationship between States
and even between entire continents contain within them-
selves substantial elements that restrict or violate
human rights. Such elements are the exploitation of la-
bor and many other abuses that affect the dignity of the
human person.
Pope John Paul II in the United
Nations General Assembly in 1979
I have been impressed by the extent to which the
basic features of effective implementation are built into
the constitutional structure of the ILO .... Though
there may be limits to the use of ILO as a precedent,
there is experience there that can be applied effectively
to the entire range of human rights concerns.
Earl Warren in the American Bar
Association Journal in 1973
INTRODUCTION
The International Labor Organization (ILO) has had the
benefit of six decades of experimentation and experience in
developing its complex set of human rights procedures. It has
learned first hand that it is never easy to pioneer, especially
when the rights in question have political as well as social and
economic implications. Only recently did the United States
return to the Organization after leaving in 1977, primarily be-
cause it considered the human rights and other business at
the ILO's yearly conference sessions to have become unduly
politicized.
o 1980 by Ernest A. Landy
* Former head of the Application of Standards Branch of the International La-
bor Office.
633
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
The first ILO standards (Conventions and Recommenda-
tions) were adopted-in Washington, D.C.-in 1919 by gov-
ernment, workers', and employers' representatives from the
Founder Members of the newly formed League of Nations.
Ever since the International Labor Organization was estab-
lished as part of the League system,1 effective implementation
of its standards has been a paramount concern. Initially this
was to be secured through a series of requirements written
into its constitution, then increasingly through an integrated
scheme of quasi-judicial and practical measures aimed at es-
tablishing the facts and securing governmental compliance
with ILO principles and obligations.
Under its mandate, the ILO covers a broad spectrum of
human rights. With "social justice"' as the ultimate objective,
the Organization seeks to improve the economic and social lot
of workers (conditions of work and life, employment promo-
tion, social security, safety and health at work, child labor,
etc.) and to safeguard their fundamental rights (freedom of
association, abolition of forced labor and of job discrimina-
tion). Over the six decades of its existence a large body of
standards has thus come into being. Successive sessions of the
International Labor Conference have adopted 153 conven-
tions-instruments which bind the states that ratify
them-and 162 recommendations-conceived mainly as
guidelines for national action. Management and labor dele-
gates have participated with government representatives in
discussing and voting these standards which together have
come to be known as the "International Labor Code."
There is no need here to describe in detail the operation
of the ILO's "standard-setting" process or the many instru-
ments so adopted over the years,' but a word must be said
about two major features of this process which have had a di-
1. For early accounts, written from a United States perspective, see J.T.
SHOTWELL, THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (1934); F.G.
WILSON, LABOR IN THE LEAGUE SYSTEM (1934).
2. See ILO CONST. preamble; Standing Orders of the International Labour Con-
ference 5 (1977) (International Labor Office, Geneva).
3. The authoritative treatise on ILO standards has recently appeared in En-
glish: N. VALTICOS, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW (1979). This publication describes the
subject in depth and contains full references to other relevant material. For a concise
survey of ILO action in the human rights field, by the same author, see HUMAN
RIGHTS THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 211-31 (B.G. Ramcharan
ed. 1979).
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rect bearing on the ILO's implementation techniques. One
such feature is the degree of preciseness with which the in-
struments are drawn up. As a rule their terms are sufficiently
specific to produce obligations which are clear and verifiable.
This is particularly important where some of the key conven-
tions spell out the right to organize, the right to freely choose
employment, and the prohibition against discrimination. The
other special factor in ILO standard-setting is Of course the
full-scale participation of labor and management representa-
tives, a departure from governments' usual monopoly on
treaty negotiation. This introduction of non-governmental ele-
ments has given the Organization an added dimension and po-
tential clearly evident throughout the various phases of its im-
plementation machinery.
The machinery works mainly along two lines, through the
examination of reports due from governments and through
the consideration of complaints. These procedures, often shar-
ing a common constitutional basis, do not function in isola-
tion, but tend increasingly to interact in their operation. A
description of the system must therefore begin with the main
obligations concerning ILO standards, since they provide the
legal framework for the whole machinery. The review of the
reporting, examination and complaints procedures, which
form the core of the system, will also cover some of the practi-
cal measures devised by the ILO to improve the functioning of
its implementation procedures. A final section will focus on
the relationship of ILO supervision with that of other interna-
tional bodies, the United Nations (UN) in particular.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF ILO PROCEDURES
The Organization was established for the improvement of
"conditions of labor" through internationally agreed instru-
ments. Almost half of the forty articles in its constitution4
deal in some way or other with the formulation and imple-
mentation of international labor conventions and recommen-
dations. There was much emphasis from the start on getting
member countries to abide by these instruments and to "se-
cure the effective observance" of ratified conventions. Some of
these constitutional provisions turned out over time to be of
4. ILO CONST. arts. 1, 19-35, & 37.
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limited practical value; others have been crucial in permitting
the development of durable supervisory arrangements. The
framers of the constitution disagreed as to whether the instru-
ments adopted by International Labor Conferences should be
automatically binding on all member states or should merely
resemble the draft treaties traditionally negotiated by diplo-
matic conferences. To bridge this gap between two seemingly
incompatible concepts of national sovereignty, a compromise
was struck which gave the ILO's quasi-legislative system some
of its most distinctive features. This compromise instituted
two types of instruments and provided in particular for their
speedy submission to the legislative authorities in each
country.
Submission of Newly Adopted Instruments to the Legislative
Authorities
The Conference procedure for the adoption of conven-
tions and recommendations, and the corellative obligations of
member states, are spelled out in article 19, the longest by far
in the ILO Constitution." Paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 deal with the
measures to be taken by governments following adoption.
Originally, the two types of instruments were designed to fa-
cilitate action by federal countries, (especially the United
States) that might find it difficult to assume international ob-
ligations involving matters falling outside federal jurisdiction
due to a division of powers between the central government
and the constituent units of the federation (states, provinces,
cantons, etc.). Until 1946, when the ILO Constitution was re-
vised, federal states could treat a convention as a recommen-
dation that is essentially a guide to internal action not subject
to ratification.'
Most significant, in terms of initiating implementation, is
the requirement under article 19 to bring conventions and rec-
ommendations before the national "authorities within whose
5. The second in length is article 35 which deals with the application of ratified
conventions in non-metropolitan territories (i.e., the colonial possessions called "non-
self-governing territories" in the UN Charter). There is no room here to go into this
aspect of the ILO's implementation system that, as decolonialization proceeded, has
lost much of its practical importance. Some details may be found in INTERNATIONAL
LABOR OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CODE 1951 at LXXXI-LXXXII (1952).
6. For an exposition of the respective roles of ILO conventions and recommen-
dations, see id. at LXVIII-LXXV.
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competence the matter lies, for the enactment of legislation or
other action." Such submission must take place twelve to
eighteen months after the Conference adopts an instrument
and the government must inform the ILO both of the nature
of its competent authorities and of the measures taken. This
set of rules has important implications. Although governments
are of course free to propose what action to take, if any, to
implement an instrument, and legislative authorities are
equally free to accept or reject the governments' proposals;
this regular linkage between the International Labor Confer-
ence and the legislative authorities in the member countries
helps the international instruments to be given prompt and
proper consideration at the national level.7 In addition, the
ILO can monitor the action taken by its membership to give
effect to the standards formulated over the years.
The national bodies exercising legislative authority vary
in nature from country to country, as does their degree of in-
dependence from the executive branch of government. In cer-
tain cases the power to give effect to an ILO instrument, in-
stead of being vested as usual in the legislature (Congress,
Parliament, National Assembly, etc.), may in fact lie with the
executive, but even then the ILO considers it "desirable" to
bring the convention or recommendation before the legisla-
ture for the purpose of "informing and mobilizing public
opinion."8
As noted above, the implementation of ILO instruments
in federal countries is liable to raise questions of divided or
shared competence. Article 19 of the constitution takes ac-
count of such contingencies by establishing special rules de-
pending on whether the subject matter is regarded by the fed-
eral government "as appropriate under its constitutional
system for federal action" or "as appropriate . . . in whole or
in part for action by the constituent states." In the latter case
"effective arrangements" are required for referring an instru-
ment to the federal, state, or other authorities and for "peri-
odical consultations" between them "with a view to promot-
7. This linkage is more fully discussed in Valticos, The International Labour
Organization and National Parliaments, 1 INTER-PARLIAMENTARY BULLETIN 16-37
(1969).
8. INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON THE
APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 38 (Report III, Part 4A 64th
Sess. of the International Labor Conference, 1978) [hereinafter cited as RCE].
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ing" coordinated action."
Reporting Obligations
The key provisions of article 19 concerning submission re-
quire member governments to inform the ILO of the steps
taken to bring conventions and recommendations before the
competent national authorities, of the nature of these authori-
ties, and "of the action taken by them." They also empower
the Governing Body, the ILO's executive board (which like
the Conference includes government, employer and worker
members), to call for reports on an unratified convention or
on a recommendation "showing the extent to which effect has
been given, or is proposed to be given" to its provisions. In the
case of a convention the reports must state "the difficulties
which prevent or delay [its] ratification." In pursuance of this
power such reports are requested each year on a limited num-
ber of instruments chosen for their importance and timeliness
and are then examined by the supervisory bodies. 10
Once a convention has been ratified, article 22 of the con-
stitution requires an annual report to the ILO "on the mea-
sures . . taken to give effect to [its] provisions." As the rati-
fication total now approaches 5,000 (involving some 140
states), the Governing Body decided recently to space out the
cycle for reporting to two or four year intervals to keep the
workload on governments and on the supervisory bodies
within reasonable limits. In doing so an effort has been made,
as will be seen below, to provide for accelerated reporting in
case of need and to focus on major problems of
implementation."
Closely connected with the requirement to send the ILO
information and reports are two provisions in article 23 of the
9. For fuller information on the position of federal states see INTERNATIONAL
LABOR CODE 1951, supra note 5, at LXXIX-LXXXI; E. A. LANDY, THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION: THIRTY YEARS OF ILO EXPERIENCE 108-114 (1966).
Out of concern for possible implementation problems, the United States has ratified
only seven conventions dealing with maritime employment and therefore within fed-
eral jurisdiction.
10. The subjects selected for article 19 reports in recent years were the employ-
ment of women with family responsibilities (1977), the abolition of forced labor
(1978), the protection of migrant workers (1979), and the minimum age for employ-
ment (1980).
11. For fuller details on these and related developments, see Samson, The
Changing Pattern of ILO Supervision, 118 INT'L LAB. REV. 569-87 (1979).
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constitution. Under paragraph 1 the Office must supply the
Conference at its yearly meetings with a summary of the data
received from governments. Under paragraph 2 each govern-
ment must communicate to the "representative organizations"
of workers and employers in the country1 copies of the infor-
mation and reports sent to the ILO. This enables organized
labor and management interests to be directly associated in
the implementation process just as they are in the adoption of
conventions and recommendations. Taken together with the
constitutional complaints provisions described below, article
23(2) gives the ILO's system a distinctive "tripartite" dimen-
sion based on the rights enjoyed by the non-governmental
participants in the procedures. It is only natural that the
functioning and results of the system have come to depend
significantly on the use which these participants make of their
special rights and opportunities.
Underpinning the operation of the reporting system is the
power granted the Governing Body, in articles 19 and 22 of
the constitution, to specify the type of information govern-
ments must supply." The report forms drawn up for this pur-
pose ask governments to indicate their law and practice in re-
gard to a given ILO instrument. In the case of ratified
conventions, a separate form is adopted as soon as they be-
come effective, 4 taking account of the special characteristics
of a given instrument but asking also about its practical appli-
cation (workers covered, inspection, litigation, etc.), about the
labor and management organizations to which copies of the
report are being sent and about any critical comments re-
ceived from these organizations.
12. These are the organizations with which governments must seek agreement
in nominating delegates and advisors to the International Labor Conference. ILO
CoNsT. art. 3, para. 5. The reference there is to the organizations "which are most
representative of employers (and) work people."
13. The formulation of these questionaires follows a certain pattern but is by no
means a matter of routine. To ascertain compliance with the obligation to submit new
instruments to the legislative authorities, for instance, the Governing Body adopted
in the 1950's a "Memorandum" spelling out the various facets of this obligation (na-
ture of the competent authority, extent and form of submission, time limits, obliga-
tions of federal states, communication to the representative organizations) and asking
a series of questions. The Governing Body has recently revised the text of this Memo-
randum; for the discussions on the subject and the new text. See ILO Governing
Body (GB) Doc. 211/15/16, 212/14/21 (1979).
14. This normally requires a minimum of two ratifications, but in some cases
(mostly conventions dealing with seafarers) a larger number is needed.
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Complaints and Representations
The constitution provides for two types of judicial pro-
ceedings to deal with cases where it is alleged that the "effec-
tive observance" of a ratified convention has not been secured.
Article 26 entitles any other member state which has also rati-
fied the convention to file a complaint; the procedure may also
be initiated by the Governing Body, of its own motion, or
when a delegate to the Conference so requests. The same arti-
cle envisages the consideration of complaints by a commission
of inquiry. Articles 27 to 29 and 31 to 34 lay down the proce-
dure to be followed in such a case, including the possibility to
refer a complaint to the International Court of Justice.
Articles 24 and 25 of the constitution enable employers'
or workers' organizations to make a formal "representation,"
another type of complaint. Under the rules laid down for this
purpose,1 5 representations are considered first by a three-
member committee of the Governing Body, then by the Gov-
erning Body itself.
Respect for Constitutional Principles
To be complete, this rapid survey of the legal basis of
ILO procedures must include a reference to the general prin-
ciples which the constitution affirms "should inspire the pol-
icy of its Members." 16 Although only ratification creates obli-
gations under specific conventions, it has been held that
membership in the Organization implies respect, in particular,
for the principles of freedom of association and of non-dis-
crimination proclaimed in the constitution. 17 The ILO's pro-
gram for the elimination of apartheid in labor matters 8 and
the ILO's special machinery in the field of freedom of associa-
15. The Governing Body has recently revised these rules; see ILO GB Doc. 212/
14/21 (1979).
16. Declaration Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the ILO. ILO CONST. an-
nex. This so-called "Declaration of Philadelphia" was adopted in 1944 as a major step
in spelling out the ILO's role and mandate in the post-war period.
17. See N. VALTICOS, supra note 3, at 43, 111-12, 248-49.
18. For a general description of this program see INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE,
THE ILO AND APARTHEID (n.d.). This contains the text of the ILO Declaration con-
cerning the Policy of Apartheid of the Republic of South Africa, adopted by the In-
ternational Labor Conference in 1964. Since 1965 the Office has submitted to the
yearly Conference sessions a series of "Special Reports" on the Application of this
Declaration which analyzes various aspects of the labor situations in that country.
South Africa's withdrawal from the ILO became effective in 1966.
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tion both are founded on these principles.
Constitutional Framework and Evolving Procedures
While the constitutional provisions and principles which
underlie the ILO's implementation procedures have remained
essentially unchanged for many years, the working and inter-
play of these procedures has continued to evolve. The machin-
ery for the regular examination of reports from governments
has been faced with a steady expansion in the ILO's member-
ship, in the number of instruments adopted, and in the total
of ratifications. There has been more interest recently in insti-
tuting complaints proceedings under the constitution, and the
freedom of association machinery developed in the 1950's is
now a major component of the system. At the same time non-
governmental participation has become more active and a se-
ries of practical measures has been introduced in order to im-
prove and integrate the operation of the various procedures.
REGULAR REPORTING AND EXAMINATION PROCEDURE
The information and reports supplied under articles 19
and 22 of the constitution are considered by two supervisory
bodies, a committee of technical experts and a tripartite com-
mittee of the International Labor Conference. This two-
phased examination process originated in 1927 when it was al-
ready clear that the Conference could not by itself cope with
the intricate and time-consuming task of evaluating the mass
of data received from governments year after year.
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations
The main responsibility for this evaluation belongs to the
Committee of Experts, currently composed of nineteen mem-
bers drawn from all parts of the world and selected for their
recognized qualifications and experience in the labor and
social field. 9 To ensure a maximum of independence, the
19. For a list of the members, indicating their background (mainly in the judi-
cial and academic areas), see 1980 RCE, supra note 8, at 3-6. It is significant that
even while the United States was absent from the ILO (1977-80) Professor Frank W.
McCulloch, a former chairman of the National Labor Relations Board, continued to
serve on the Committee of Experts; his predecessor had been Chief Justice Earl
Warren.
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Governing Body appoints the members in their personal ca-
pacity and on the proposal not of their government but of the
ILO Director-General; this may help to account for the Com-
mittee's tradition of strict impartiality and objectivity, as pro-
claimed in its fundamental principles.2 0
In addition to the information supplied by governments,
the Committee of Experts makes use of any other reliable evi-
dence bearing on national law and practice, including any
comments workers' or employers' organizations have sent the
ILO on the effect given to ILO instruments in their country.
The Committee's findings take different forms, depending on
the type of reports. In the case of an unratified convention or
a recommendation selected by the Governing Body for a re-
porting under article 19 of the constitution, the Committee
prepares a "general survey," a comprehensive study covering
also the situation of ratifying states. The purpose of these
surveys is to review the degree and difficulties of implementa-
tion, and through this sort of general balance-sheet to help
the ILO membership to understand and implement the in-
struments under review."'
Ever since its creation, however, the Committee of Ex-
perts' primary function has been to verify whether member
countries live up to their basic obligation "to make effective
the provisions of [a ratified] Convention" (article 19, para-
graph 5(d) of the constitution). With over 100 conventions
now in force and with many, especially the major human
20. For a statement reviewing the Committee's principles, mandate, and meth-
ods of work on the occasion of its 50th anniversary, see 1977 RCE, supra note 8, at 6-
15. Elaborating on its basic principles, the Committee recalled that ILO conventions
are "international standards, and the manner in which their implementation is evalu-
ated must be uniform and must not be affected by concepts derived from any particu-
lar social or economic system." Id. at 11. Although the whole Committee subscribed
to this "approach," the U.S.S.R. and Polish members, Professors Tunkin and Gubin-
ski dissented from the Committee's findings on the application of the forced labor
and freedom of association conventions in "some socialist countries," id. at 82; in
their opinion "account should be taken of the economic and social system in these
countries." In response the Committee recalled that it has "made no assumptions
about capitalist, socialist or Third World countries. It applies to all, impartially, the
same test of conformity to obligations undertaken by each country under ratified con-
ventions." Id. at 11, 82, 134-35.
21. See note 10 supra for the type of subjects covered; the Committee of Ex-
perts examines the article 19 reports the year after they are due and publishes the
survey in volume B of its report; thus the most recent forced labor survey figures
(there were others in 1962 and 1968) are in 1979 RCE, supra note 8; the survey on
the employment of women with family responsibilities is in 1978 RCE, supra note 8.
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rights instruments, now binding on a large proportion of the
ILO's membership,22 the yearly workload of supervision is
heavy. To focus on essentials, only some of the Committee's
findings are published, as "observations," in its report; the
rest take the form of "direct requests" communicated to the
government for reply in its next report. Apparent cases of
non-compliance can thus be explored in a low key manner and
many of the Committee's comments are initially made in this
way. The observations in the Committee's report, though
couched in careful, diplomatic language, clearly state how na-
tional law and practice fall short of ILO requirements and in-
dicate what measures are needed to secure full conformity.
28
To deal with serious and persistent violations of a ratified
convention, the Committee has developed as a further means
of pressure the possibility to add to its observation a distinc-
tive "footnote" asking the government to "report in detail"
for the following year or to "supply full particulars" to the
Conference at its next session or it may ask for both. Since
routine reporting now follows a two or four year cycle, such a
request implies that the matter is urgent.
Conference Committee on the Application of Conventions
and Recommendations
The technical findings of the Committee of Experts en-
able the Conference to carry out a tripartite review through a
standing committee of government, employer, and worker
members set up at each yearly session in June and to pick out
the most flagrant cases and invite the governments concerned
to discuss them at one of the Committee's sittings. In the light
of the explanations and promises so received, the Application
Committee can then report its own conclusions to the Confer-
ence. For this purpose it has followed a practice since the
22. At the beginning of 1980 the ratification totals were as follows: Freedom of
Association Convention (No. 87) ratified by 92 states; Right to Organize and Collec-
tive Bargaining Convention (No. 98)-109 states; Forced Labor Convention (No.
29)-121 states; Abolition of Forced Labor Convention (No. 105)-105 states; Dis-
crimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (No. 111)-98 states; Equal
Renumeration Convention (No. 100)-98 states. Chart of Ratifications ILO Conven-
tions, Jan. 1980.
23. The Committee of Experts also uses observations and direct requests when
governments fail to comply with the constitutional obligation to bring newly adopted
ILO instruments before their legislative authorities and to report to the ILO on rati-
fied and unratified instruments. See note 8 supra.
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1950's of indicating in its report the countries which have re-
peatedly failed to comply with their obligations under the ILO
Constitution. Serious violations, mainly of human rights con-
ventions, are singled out for special mention in separate
paragraphs summing up the often lengthy discussions on such
major cases.2 '
The Conference Committee on Application thus repre-
sents the final phase of the ILO's regular reporting and exami-
nation process. Because the forum is tripartite, committee
members-mostly from the workers' and employers'
benches-have a chance to question, criticize and prod gov-
ernments.2 5 Though limited by time to major cases, and not
always conclusive in its outcome, this unusually open dialogue
has become so much a part of the Conference Committee's
routine that it is quite exceptional for a government to refuse
to participate. Governments criticized in the Application
Committee's report have instead used the discussion in the
plenary conference to hit back, succeeding on two occasions to
prevent formal adoption of the report.2 Such "retaliatory" ac-
tion does not however affect the validity of the supervisory
comments or the regular continuation of the examination
24. See, e.g., the Committee's report in Provisional Record, INT'L LABOR CONF.
No. 37 at 11-13, 19-22 (1980), for the report of a working party on the functioning of
this special list and paragraph system.
25. For a description of the Committee's character, functioning, and "atmo-
sphere," see Landy, supra note 9, at 36-49. For the detailed results of a full session,
see Provisional Record, supra note 24, which runs to 62 double-column pages.
26. The Soviet Union, which has ratified 43 conventions, tends to be vocal in
defending itself against the critical comments of the Committee of Experts, especially
in regard to freedom of association and forced labor, sometimes provoking long and
heated discussions in the Conference Committee. When the United States govern-
ment, in a letter signed by Secretary of State Kissinger, gave notice in November
1975 of its intention to withdraw from the ILO, it mentioned among "matters of fun-
damental concern" the International Labor Conference's "appallingly selective con-
cern in the application of the ILO's basic conventions on Freedom of Association and
Forced Labor. It pursues the violations of human rights in some member states. It
grants immunity from such citations to others." This reflected inter alia events of the
previous year when the Application Committee had placed the Soviet Union on the
special list for violating the Forced Labor Convention, but the Committee's report
had not been adopted in plenary, due to lack of a quorum. Provisional Record, INT'L
LABOR CONF. Nos. 36, 44 (1974). Three years later, when the Application Committee's
report contained special paragraphs censuring Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union
on human rights issues, the report was again not adopted. Id. Nos. 25, 31 (1977). The
United States' period of nonmembership lasted from November 1977 to February
1980.
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process.27
The Role of Workers and Employers
Because they receive copies of their country's reports to
the ILO every year, the representative organizations of em-
ployers and workers are in the privileged position of being
able to play a sustained and active role in the regular exami-
nation procedure. Governments must indicate in all their re-
ports to which organizations these copies are communicated,
and the Committee of Experts has in fact found a high degree
of compliance with this obligation. What really matters of
course is the use the organizations make of their special sta-
tus, that is, whether they do bring problems of implementa-
tion in their country to the ILO's attention.
For many years the Committee of Experts had expressed
its disappointment that so few organizations took advantage
of this possibility. When in 1972 it reviewed the whole ques-
tion of the role of workers and employers in the implementa-
tion of ILO standards, it noted that the annual number of
comments from non-governmental organizations over the pre-
vious few years had been twelve on the average. 8 Since then
the International Labor Office has taken a series of measures
to make the organizations better aware of their opportunities.
Among them have been to supply lists of reports requested
from their governments to the central organizations in each
country, together with copies of report forms and of the com-
ments from the Committee of Experts; to hold occasional
study courses of worker representatives attending the ILO's
general or regional conferences; and, to publish a workers' ed-
ucation manual on standards.2 9 These practical steps seem to
have had some impact because the yearly average of com-
ments has now gone up to seventy.5 0
27. In 1978 the Committee of Experts specifically referred to the discussions
which had taken place in the Conference Application Committee the previous year
and expressed the hope that the governments concerned would take them "into full
account"; see 1978 RCE, supra note 8, at 29.
28. See 1972 RCE, supra note 8, at 10-25. In 1977 the Conference adopted a
resolution entitled Strengthening of Tripartism in ILO Supervisory Procedures of In-
ternational Standards and Technical Co-operation; see Provisional Record, INT'L LA-
BOR CONP. No. 28 at 7-9 (1977).
29. INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS-A
WORKERS' EDUCATION MANUAL (1978).
30. See Samson, supra note 11, at 574-76, where it is also indicated that 30
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To stimulate more active involvement of labor and man-
agement interests in the member states, the Conference
adopted in 1976 a convention and a recommendation concern-
ing tripartite consultation in regard to the preparation, appli-
cation, and ratification of ILO standards. If the regular, sys-
tematic consultations envisaged in the 1976 instruments can
become institutionalized in an increasing number of countries,
this should further promote non-governmental participation
in the ILO's compliance procedures at both the country and
the international levels.
Helping Governments Improve Compliance
The objective of the two supervisory committees is not so
much to publicize cases of non-compliance (especially with
ratified ILO conventions), but to give governments a lead in
overcoming the difficulties which prevent full implementation.
These difficulties are as varied as the labor and social issues
involved, as intractable sometimes as the economic conditions
they reflect. They can range from administrative inefficiency
to"serious legal, constitutional, even political problems.3'
When the Committee of Experts came to realize more
and more that in certain cases neither its own comments nor
the dialogue in the Application Committee of the Conference
were sufficient to produce results, it suggested that informal
on-the-spot discussions between key government officials and
a representative of the ILO Director-General might sometimes
be of help. The rules under which this system of so-called "di-
rect contacts" originated in 1968. They require a government's
consent for such an ILO visit, permit regular supervision to be
suspended for one year at the most, and provide for the asso-
ciation of the workers' and employers' organizations in the
country. Since then thirty countries, many in Latin America,
have asked for such contacts and the Committee of Experts
has found that in about half the cases involved there has been
progress towards compliance.2
percent of the comments are from employers' and 70 percent from workers' organiza-
tions; two-thirds come from industrialized and the balance from developing countries.
For a list of the 77 comments examined by the Committee of Experts in 1979, see
1979 RCE, supra note 8, at 28-29.
31. For a discussion of some of the major legal and practical obstacles to com-
pliance, see generally LANDY, supra note 9, at 79-150.
32. For a review of the working of the direct contacts procedure over its first
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This procedural innovation has a number of advantages.
Instead of public criticism by the supervisory bodies, "quiet
diplomacy" can for a limited period be given a chance to
work."3 Contacts can also be used to help governments comply
with their constitutional obligations, such as submission and
reporting. Finally, these discussions represent an informal
type of fact-finding and conciliation used by the ILO's free-
dom of association machinery, as described below, and as an
opportunity to discuss technical issues at stake in a judicial
complaint procedure.
There are other ways in which governments are given
help to achieve better compliance. The ILO sends advisory
missions, organizes regional seminars on national and interna-
tional labor standards for labor ministry personnel, and has in
the past decade used its regional conferences in Africa, Asia,
and the Americas to review the ratification and implementa-
tion of conventions in a given part of the world. 4
The Effects of Supervision
The scope and complexity of the system, the work and
strain it involves for the participants-especially govern-
ments-and the considerable experience now gained with its
operation, all raise legitimate questions as to the actual im-
pact ILO compliance procedures have on the law and prac-
tice 5 of member states. The Committee of Experts, in partic-
ular, has been increasingly concerned with the extent to
which its own observations, often repeated again and again,
lead eventually to fuller implementation of ratified conven-
tions. Starting in 1963, the Committee has listed in its report
the cases where it has been able to express satisfaction at
measures taken by governments to make the necessary
changes in their law or practice following earlier comments by
ten years of operation, see 1979 RCE, supra note 8, at 13-27.
33. For a more general view of ILO efforts in this direction, see Valticos, Diplo-
macy in an International Framework: Some Aspects of ILO Practice and Experience
(Vol. 3), 1974 LA COMUNITA INTERNAZIONALE.
34. The most recent regional review of this kind focused on the Western Hemi-
sphere; see INTERNATIONAL LABOR OiwcIE, ILO ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARRIBEAN 47-80 (Report I Part 2 to the 11th Conference of American States Mem-
bers of the International Labour Organization, at Medellin, Colombia 1979).
35. For a survey of the means available to promote compliance with ratified
conventions not only in law but also in everyday practice, see 1978 RCE, supra note
8, at 13-23.
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the Committee. During the past seventeen years a total of
1,300 such cases of progress have been tabulated, at an aver-
age of seventy-five annually."
Taken by itself, this figure tells only part of the story: it
does not indicate the proportion of cases where the Commit-
tee of Experts' many observations have led or have failed to
lead to better compliance.87 Moreover, there are a variety of
other circumstances in which ILO standards-ratified or
not-may have some bearing on national law and practice.88
In legal terms, ILO supervision occasionally has another
interesting, though negative effect. When there is pressure to
eliminate a violation and a government concludes that it can-
not comply, it can free itself from its obligations by denounc-
ing the convention.3 9 This has happened in only thirty cases, a
very small proportion of the nearly 5,000 ratifications cur-
rently in force.
JUDICIAL PROCEDURES
Although the framers of the ILO Constitution provided
for formal representations and complaints as an essential part
of the "enforcement" system, these judicial procedures have
been invoked on a limited scale only. Clearly the steady devel-
opment of the regular examination machinery offered an al-
ternative, except in very special cases, and even then the two
36. See 1980 RCE, supra note 8, at 22-23.
37. For a detailed tabulation of the results of the first thirty years of ILO super-
vision (1927-1939, 1947-1964), see E. LANDY, supra note 9. The findings indicated
that up to then 32 percent of the Committee of Experts' observations had led to full
compliance, 29 percent had led to partial implementation, 2 percent had caused the
governments to denounce the convention, and in the remaining 37 percent there had
been no apparent effect; id. at 66. For a tabulation of results by groups of conventions
and by world regions, see id. at 68-69, 72-73.
38. The general influence of ILO standards is discussed in INTERNATIONAL LA-
BOR OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS (1976) and, in less detail, in Landy, The Influence of International Labour
Standards: Possibilities and Performance, 101 INT'L LAB. REV. 555-604 (1970). For a
list of other articles on the influence of ILO conventions in a cross-section of coun-
tries, see N. VALTICOS, supra note 3, at 245; a recent addition to this list is Albalate
Lafita, The Influence of International Labour Conventions on Labour Law and So-
cial Change in Spain, 118 INT'L LAB. REV. 443-57 (1979).
39. Unless a revised version of the instrument is ratified simultaneously, the
final articles of all conventions (adopted since 1932) specify that outright denuncia-
tion is possible at ten-yearly intervals. See INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, CONVEN-
TIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE,
1919-1966 (1966).
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types of procedures have tended to complement and reinforce
each other in their operation.
Complaints
It took four decades for ILO member states to lodge for-
mal complaints under article 26. When they finally did so in
1961, serious charges of human rights violations (forced or
compulsory labor) were leveled at Portugal (in respect of its
colonies of Angola, Guinea, and Mozambique) on the one
hand, and at Liberia on the other.40 The Governing Body ap-
pointed personalities of proven caliber and independence to
inquire into the charges and the three-man commissions so set
up carried out their work along similar lines. Written and oral
information was obtained not only from the countries directly
concerned but also from international organizations of work-
ers and employers, and from other non-governmental bodies;
in addition, one commission carried out an on-the-spot visit
(to Angola and Mozambique). The detailed recommendations
made in the respective reports were accepted and initially im-
plemented by the parties. Most significant in terms of con-
tinuity of compliance, was the request to'both Liberia and
Portugal to indicate, in their regular reports on the applica-
tion of the forced labor conventions, the action taken during
the period under review to give effect to the commission's rec-
ommendations.41 This coordinated approach enabled the
Committee of Experts and the Conference to keep subsequent
developments under review.
The next complaint was lodged in 1968 when workers'
delegates at the Conference charged the Colonels' regime in
Greece with non-observance of the ILO's freedom of associa-
tion conventions. The commission of inquiry examining this
case followed the precedent set in the two forced labor cases
and suggested that the violations it had found be kept under
review by the regular supervisory committees.4 ' The same
40. When a complaint against Portugal was first filed by Ghana within the con-
text of decolonialization in Africa, the government in Lisbon chose as its target for
retaliation Liberia, long under strong criticism from the ILO's supervisory commit-
tees for its infringements of the Forced Labor Convention.
41. The reports of the Commissions of Inquiry appeared in 45 ILO OFF. BULL.
No. 2, Supp. 11 (1962); id. (1963).
42. In its report the Commission underlined the relationship between trade
union rights and civil liberties; see 54 ILO OFF. BULL. No. 2, Spec. Supp. (1971). After
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linkage was again applied in the next case, involving Chile: a
1974 Conference resolution censuring the labor policies intro-
duced by the Pinochet government after it seized power, led
to the appointment of yet another commission of inquiry
which visited the country and determined that there were
breaches of the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)
Convention. The ILO's supervision machinery has since been
pursuing the matter on a regular basis.43
During the 1975, 1976, and 1977 sessions of the Confer-
ence, workers' delegates lodged complaints under article 26 of
the constitution against Uruguay, Bolivia, and Argentina. Be-
cause they all involved the freedom of association conven-
tions, the Governing Body decided, prior to setting up com-
missions of inquiry, to refer the three cases initially to its own
Freedom of Association Committee, as mentioned below.
During the past two decades the complaint procedure has
thus been triggered in a variety of circumstances, but has al-
ways focused on the three fundamental human rights of major
concern to the ILO. Interestingly, the procedure has now also
begun to be used to deal with difficulties in giving effect to
more technical standards, as in the employment of seafarers.
The government of France first invoked article 26 in 1976
against Panama, alleging non-compliance with the Shipown-
ers' Liability (Sick and Injured Seamen) Convention; when
the unpaid claims were quickly settled, no commission of in-
quiry had to be set up.44 In 1978 France filed two further com-
plaints charging Panama with breaches of the Officers' Com-
petency Certificates Convention, the Repatriation of Seamen
Convention and the Food and Catering (Ships' Crews) Con-
vention; the Governing Body decided to refer these issues to a
commission but then suspended the proceedings because the
two parties agreed to use direct contacts to resolve their con-
the Colonels were overthrown, compliance with the conventions was restored; see
1977 RCE, supra note 8, at 147-48.
43. The Commission had also been asked to examine the application of the
Hours of Work (Industry) Convention and had found no breaches; see Report of the
Commission Appointed Under Article 26 of the Constitution to Examine the Obser-
vance by Chile of the Hours of Work (Industry) Convention, 1919 (No. 1) and the
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111), ILO GB
Doc. 196/4/10 (1975). As indicated below, the Commission's main function was within
the framework of the ILO's freedom of association procedure. See note 67 infra.
44. See ILO GB Doc. 202/7/15 (1977).
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flict." Thus the less formal device of contacts involving repre-
sentatives of the Director-General, first introduced by the
Committee of Experts, is now also being used in an attempt to
avoid full-scale operation of a judicial procedure.
Representations
If effective utilization of the complaints procedure has
been relatively recent, article 24 of the constitution was in-
voked several times during the ILO's early years, so that the
Governing Body found it necessary in the 1930's to adopt a
set of rules for the discussion of representations. More re-
cently, several significant cases involving both technical and
human rights issues have demonstrated the potential of this
type of compliance procedure.
Under the above-mentioned rules," the case is examined
first by a three-member committee, one from each group in
the Governing Body, then by the Governing Body itself. In
1965 and 1970 a workers' organization in Brazil and an em-
ployers' organization in Italy filed representations alleging
breaches of the ILO conventions on labor inspection and on
the employment service, respectively. Interestingly enough,
both governments in the end denounced the convention in
question, admitting thereby their inability or unwillingness to
comply with its requirements." In 1977 a representation from
the Swedish Dockworkers' Union accusing France, the
Netherlands, and Poland of not observing the ILO standards
for marking the weight on heavy packages transported by ves-
sels, was passed directly to the Committee of Experts so it
could monitor application of the necessary safety measures in
the three countries.48 About the same period, article 24 was
again brought into play, this time to verify compliance with
one of the ILO's major human rights instruments.
In 1977 and 1978 two trade union internationals filed
charges that the Discrimination (Employment and Occupa-
45. See ILO GB Doc. 211/5/9 (1979).
46. As indicated above these rules have just been revised, see note 15 supra.
47. In each case the Governing Body had asked the Committee of Experts to
pursue the matter during its periodic examinations; for the Committee's final obser-
vation on the Italian case, a sort of supervisory post mortem, see 1972 RCE, supra
note 8, at 165-66.
48. The Governing Body thereupon declared the procedure closed; see ILO GB
Doc. 202/5/1 (1977).
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tion) Convention was being violated in Czechoslovakia and in
the Federal Republic of Germany: the International Confeder-
ation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) which lodged the first
representation and the World Federation of Trade Unions
(WFTU) which initiated the second, both have consultative
status with the ILO.4 9
The Czechoslovak case had its roots in the post-Dubcek
era when the Committee of Experts and the Conference Com-
mittee on Application repeatedly insisted that under the re-
cently revised legislation (labor and penal codes) workers
could be dismissed from their jobs purely because of their po-
litical opinions, a serious breach of the Discrimination Con-
vention. The material submitted by the ICFTU in support of
its representation documented dismissals, transfers, and other
punitive action taken against workers who had signed or sup-
ported the "Charter 77 Manifesto" (issued in Prague on Janu-
ary 1, 1977). This Manifesto accused the government of vio-
lating the International Covenants on human rights. The mass
of material and the government's response were examined by
a tripartite committee of the Governing Body which con-
cluded that the reply to the charges was "not satisfactory."
The Governing Body endorsed this finding in 1978 and de-
cided, in pursuance of article 25 of the constitution, to publish
the committee's report. 0 As a sanction for non-observance,
the publicity thus given to the case was not merely a platonic
gesture. The scope and weight of the evidence made availa-
ble51 accentuated the seriousness of the violation and under-
lined the need for regular follow-up. This helps to explain the
fact that the case most thoroughly discussed by the Confer-
ence Committee on Application in June 1979 and 1980 was
49. In 1976 the WFTU had also filed a representation against Denmark, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, charging that a "political-
policing" inquiry by the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Coal
& Steel Community (ECSC) and EURATOM had discriminated against their officials
on the grounds of political opinion, in contravention of the Discrimination Conven-
tion to which the four countries were parties. In 1978 the Governing Body endorsed
the finding of its tripartate committee, that the representation was "irreceivable as
regards form," see ILO GB Doc. 205/8/17 (1978).
50. See 61 ILO OFF. BULL. Ser. A., No. 3, Supp. (1978).
51. Appendix III of the report contains a 4,000 word statement sent to the Fed-
eral Assembly of Czechoslovakia on behalf of the "Charter 77" movement and 47
annexes reproducing letters of dismissal and related correspondence, records of trade
union meetings, court decisions, etc. Id. at 11-53.
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that of Czechoslovakia. 2
As to the other representation involving the Discrimina-
tion (Employment and Occupation) Convention, the WFTU
charged that the Federal Republic of Germany denied its citi-
zens access to employment in public service on political
grounds. In November 1979 the Governing Body approved the
report of its tripartite committee which had found that new
federal regulations in force since April 1979 should secure re-
spect for the requirements of the convention; looking to the
future, the report added that the practical application of these
regulations and the situation "at the level of the Laender"
would be examined "in accordance with established ILO pro-
cedures for . ..ratified conventions." '
FREEDOM OF AsSOCIATION MACHINERY
Whereas the two kinds of judicial complaints under the
ILO Constitution have only been used on a limited scale, and
mostly over the past decade or two, a rather different type of
procedure initiated after World War II has since developed
into such a prime component of the ILO system that close to
a thousand cases of alleged violation of trade union rights
have by now come before it. This freedom of association ma-
chinery is based on a 1950 agreement between the ILO and
the UN.54 In 1948 and 1949 the ILO had adopted its two
landmark conventions on freedom of association, the right to
organize and collective bargaining, but it was far from certain
then whether they would be as widely ratified as they in fact
have been since. 5
Under this procedure, complaints may be submitted by
governments or by employers' or workers' organizations, re-
gardless of whether or not the state accused of violation is a
52. See Report of the Conference Committee, Provisional Record No. 36, at 45-
49 (1979); id. No. 37 at 45-49 (1980). In 1980, the case was singled out for special
mention in the Committee's report to the Conference. See note 24 supra.
53. The report of the tripartite committee appears in ILO GB Doc. 210/16/27
(1978).
54. See E.S.C. Res. 277, 10 ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) 9-10 (1950).
55. For details on the genesis and operation of the machinery, see C.W. JENKS,
THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF TRADE UNION FREEDOM, (1957); C.W. JENKS, THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF TRADE UNION RIGHTS in THE INTERNATIONAL PROTEC-
TION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 210-47 (Evan Luard ed. 1967); N. Valticos, Les Methodes de
la Protection Internationale de la Liberte Syndicale 1 Academie de Droit Interna-
tional, Recuceil des Cours 77-138 (1975).
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party to the conventions on the subject. As indicated earlier,
freedom of association is one of the key principles in the ILO
Constitution that countries are pledged to observe by virtue of
their membership of the Organization.6 But in the absence of
ratification, the objective of the procedure is to promote,
rather than to ensure, compliance and the two-phased ma-
chinery operates with this distinction in mind.
Committee on Freedom of Association
The Committee is appointed by the Governing Body and
consists of nine members, chosen in equal numbers from its
government, employers' and workers' groups. All freedom of
association complaints, filed almost exclusively by national
and international trade union organizations, are first submit-
ted to this committee. Examination by the committee was
conceived originally as a preliminary step in the procedure,
but it soon became more substantive. The committee insists
in particular that governments against which allegations are
made should respond, so that a maximum of evidence is avail-
able.5 7 As will be seen, the second phase of the procedure has
been used on only a few occasions, so that the bulk of the
complaints has had to be handled within the Governing Body.
Violations of trade union rights are all too prevalent
around the world. Organizations are interfered with or dis-
solved by governments, labor leaders are imprisoned, or re-
strictive new laws are enacted. Often it is left to the trade
union internationals having consultative status with the ILO
to bring such cases before the Freedom of Association Com-
mittee. When the issues at stake are especially urgent or com-
plex, ILO representatives (independent personalities or mem-
bers of the staff) have at times been able, with the
government's consent, to discuss problems on the spot in or-
der to ascertain the facts and report back to the committee.
Direct contacts of this type have been on the increase in re-
cent years.58 At the request of the International Labor Confer-
56. See 1974 resolution concerning freedom of association and industrial rela-
tions in Europe, in 57 ILO OF. BULL. Nos. 2, 3, 4 at 152 (1974).
57. The first two decades of operation were discussed in von Potobosky, Protec-
tion of Trade Union Rights-Twenty Years' Work by the Committee on Freedom of
Association, 105 INT'L LAB. REv. 69-83 (1972).
58. In 1978, for instance, such visits were made to Argentina, Chile, the Domini-
can Republic, Tunisia, and the United Kingdom territory of Antigua (in the
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ence,59 the Freedom of Association Committee has also been
reviewing other possibilities to improve and speed up the op-
eration of its procedures, and to follow up periodically the
cases examined. 0
That such procedural refinements are necessary is clear
from the record. Although an impressive body of "case law"
has been accumulated over the years,6" the results have been
far from consistent. Some governments have taken account of
the Governing Body's recommendations. 2 In other cases, in-
cluding two in Latin America which were referred to the Free-
dom of Association Committee several years ago after com-
plaints under article 26 of the Constitution, progress has been
painfully slow.68 In two more recent cases involving Eastern
European countries, the committee submitted a series of "in-
terim reports" to the Governing Body in 1979.6
Caribbean).
59. In a resolution concerning the promotion, protection and strengthening of
freedom of association, trade union and other human rights, the Conference called for
"speedy and effective action in cases in which freedom of association is impaired,
particularly when human life is in jeopardy"; see Provisional Record No. 30, supra
note 28, at 13-14.
60. In 1979 the Governing Body approved a series of proposals by the Commit-
tee regarding "questions of procedure"; this covered relations with complainants and
governments, urgent reports, on-the-spot missions, hearing of the parties and even
some type of "moral constraints" on governments which refuse to cooperate; see ILO
GB Doc. 209/6/9 (1979).
61. For a systematic compilation, covering the first two decades of the proce-
dure, see INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, Digest of Decisions
of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO (1974).
62. See THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS, supra note 38, at 72-73. In 1979 the Freedom of Association Committee re-
ported to the Governing Body that since the beginning of 1976 its examination of a
number of cases involving the arrest, detention or exile of trade unionists had led to
the release of over 250 of them in some thirteen countries and in one case (Bolivia) to
the granting of a general amnesty; see ILO GB Doc. 209/6/9 at 2 (1979).
63. See ILO GB Doc. 210/9/14 (1979) (Argentina); ILO GB Doc. 211/12/11
(1979) (Uraguay). Both these cases were also dicussed at length in the Conference
Committee on Application in 1979, see Provisional Record No. 36, supra note 24, at
32-34, 40. In the case of Bolivia the Governing Body had found sufficient progress, in
1978, to close both the freedom of association and the article 26 procedures; see ILO
GB Doc. 206/6/15 (1978).
64. In 1978 the ICFTU and the World Confederation of Labor (WCL, an inter-
national association of Christian trade unions) filed complaints against the USSR and
Poland, charging in both cases that it is impossible to set up labor unions indepen-
dent of the state and of the Communist Party and that workers who wanted to do so
had been jailed and otherwise victimized. The Freedom of Association Committee
reported to the Governing Body in November 1979 that the Polish government was
revising its trade union legislation to bring it "formally into line" with the terms of
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Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission
Originally, the Commission was to be the main body re-
sponsible for examining freedom of association complaints,
but only with the consent of the government concerned. Dur-
ing the early years, governments were reluctant to give their
agreement, so that the only action open to the Governing
Body was to publicize this refusal and the findings of its Free-
dom of Association Committee.65 Eventually two important
cases involving countries not bound by the ILO's standards on
freedom of association did come before the Fact-Finding and
Conciliation Commission.
In 1964 the Japanese government agreed to the referral of
a complaint regarding the trade union rights of public em-
ployees. The procedure followed for this case was patterned
on the examination of formal constitutional complaints under
article 26. Three independent personalities appointed by the
Governing Body received written and oral testimony and vis-
ited Japan before issuing their report." Acceptance of the
Commission's detailed conclusions and recommendations by
the government and the General Council of Trade Unions of
Japan paved the way for continued efforts at the national
level to settle the issues at stake. The procedures also had an-
other major result when Japan, in 1965, ratified the Freedom
of Association Convention. Thus the Commission's essential
task, not judicial, but investigatory and conciliatory in charac-
ter as its name indicates, has also had long-range effects on
collective bargaining in the Japanese public sector.
The second major case concerned Chile. Following the
overthrow of President Allende in 1973, all the major trade
union internationals lodged complaints with the ILO. The
the Freedom of Association Convention and suggested direct contacts for this pur-
pose. In May 1980 a high ILO official visited Poland and made specific recommenda-
tions to guarantee respect for the Convention. The large-scale emergencies of a free
trade union movement in Poland, following the wave of strikes in July and August
throws light on the ILO's examination of this case. As for the USSR case, in response
to the government's contention that it had in no way violated the convention, the
Freedom of Association Committee recalled the Committee of Experts' criticism of
Soviet legislation and questioned the government's repressive measures against the
founders of two independent workers' associations. See ILO GB Doc. 211/12/10 at 97-
103, 110-18 (1979).
65. The cases in question were wound up in 1953 (Czechoslovakia) and in 1958
(Hungary, USSR).
66. See 49 ILO OFF. BULL. No. 1, Spec. Supp. (1966).
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military regime accepted the Governing Body's request that
the alleged violations be examined by the Fact-Finding and
Conciliation Commission. The three member body appointed
the following year was asked to also perform the functions of
the Commission of Inquiry set up to consider the complaint
under article 26 on two ratified conventions. In its report,
issued in 1975, the Commission mentioned the wide array of
contacts its members had had during their visit to Chile (in-
cluding talks with jailed labor leaders). In light of the variety
of repressive measures it had discovered, the Commission
stressed the close connection between trade union rights and
civil liberties. Among its conclusions was a suggestion for an
interesting procedural innovation, that the government should
be asked to report under article 19 of the ILO Constitution
(unratified conventions) on the effect given to the Commis-
sion's recommendations.6  The government accepted the re-
port, though with reservations, and the Governing Body has
continued to follow developments, such as the new trade
union legislation promulgated in June 1979."'
Under the terms of the UN-ILO agreement, the Fact-
Finding and Conciliation Commission can also examine, with
the government's consent, cases involving UN member states
which do not belong to the ILO. The Commission's first re-
port of such a case, concerning Lesotho (a country in southern
Africa), was transmitted by the Governing Body to the UN in
1975.70 Another case, initiated during the period after the
United States withdrawal from the ILO in 1977, deals with
trade union matters in Puerto Rico and is still under
consideration.7'
AD Hoc PROCEDURES
The element of pragmatic innovation which has marked
the development of ILO procedures is nowhere more apparent
67. See note 43 supra.
68. See INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, THE TRADE UNION SITUATION IN CHn.E
(1975); for an analysis of the twin-procedures, see Valticos, Un double type d'enquete
de l'Organisation internationale du Travail au Chili, ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROrr
INTERNATIONAL 483-502 (1975). The government supplied the article 19 reports
requested.
69. See the report of the Freedom of Association Committee in ILO GB Doc.
211/12/10, at 61-81 (1978).
70. See ILO GB Doc. 197/3/5 (1975).
71. See ILO GB Docs. 208/21/6 and 209/14/1 (1979).
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than in the ad hoc inquiries carried out from time to time to
deal with special situations. These have usually arisen against
a background of political problems and have involved funda-
mental questions of human rights, so that they deserve at
least brief mention here.
A prime example is the examination of the charges
brought some twenty years ago by the major trade union in-
ternationals against the Franco regime in Spain. Following
prolonged consideration of these complaints by the Governing
Body Committee on Freedom of Association and the govern-
ment's refusal to have them submitted to the Fact-Finding
and Conciliation Commission, the impasse was broken when
Madrid decided to ask the ILO to appoint a study group to
examine the labor and trade union situation in Spain. This
body followed in all respects a procedure patterned on that of
the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission and of article
26 commissions of inquiry. Its three members received evi-
dence from many quarters, visited Spain and in 1969 issued a
detailed report 2 which was given wide circulation, even inside
the country. This ad hoc inquiry, with all its earmarks of a
face-saving device, turned out to be a significant factor when
the post-Franco government enacted new labor legislation in
1977.73
A more recent example in a different setting involves
questions of equality of opportunity and treatment of the
Arab workers living in the territories occupied by Israel. In
response to a politically inspired Conference resolution con-
demning Israel for alleged discrimination against these work-
ers, the Director-General sent a team of senior ILO officials to
carry out on-the-spot visits to Israel and the territories. The
reports of these missions, whose findings and suggestions were
based on the ILO's constitutional principles and on its con-
vention concerning job discrimination, were submitted to the
International Labor Conference7 4 where they helped to pro-
72. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OnFicE THE LABOUR AND TRADE UNION SITUA-
TION IN SPAIN (1969) and Valticos, Une nouvelle experience de protection des droits
de l'homme: le groupe d'etude de IOT charge d'examiner la situation et en matiere
de travail en matiere syndical en Espagne, 1970 ANNUALS ANNAIRE FRANCAIS DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 567-89.
73. Spain subsequently ratified the Freedom of Association and the Right to
Organize Conventions. See in this connection the article by Albalate Lafita, supra
note 38.
74. See action taken on the resolutions adopted by the International Labor
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vide a more legally and technically oriented framework for the
discussions.s
Under article 10 of the constitution, the International La-
bor Office has a general competence to "conduct . . . special
investigations ordered by the Conference or the Governing
Body." This mandate has been used, in particular, to prepare
the special reports on apartheid in the Republic of South Af-
rica, no longer a member of the ILO.76 However, no use has
been made so far of a mechanism instituted by the Governing
Body in 1973 to carry out special surveys aimed at imple-
menting the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)
Convention in ILO member countries. 77
COOPERATION BETWEEN ILO AND OTHER COMPLIANCE
PROCEDURES
Over the past two decades other international organiza-
tions, global and regional, have framed a series of instruments
with labor and social implications. Arrangements to coordi-
nate the implementation procedures for such instruments
with those of the ILO are essential, not only to ensure consis-
tency of approach in the interpretation of corresponding pro-
visions but also to share information and to help reinforce
supervisory impact. In some cases these cooperative arrange-
ments are envisaged in the instruments themselves.
United Nations and UNESCO
The International Covenants on Human Rights adopted
in 1966 contain many provisions relating to labor, but because
of their comprehensive nature rights provided for in the cove-
nants are not as specifically spelled out as in ILO standards. 8
Conference at its 59th to 64th Sessions in Supplement to the Report of the Director-
General at 22-53 (65th Sess. 1979), and 24-32 (64th Sess. 1978). These missions were
headed by Mr. Nicolas Valticos in his capacity as Assistant Director-General of the
International Labor Office.
75. See Quackenbush, Highlights of the 1979 ILO Conference, 1979 MONTHLY
LAB. REV. 65-67 (Oct. 1979).
76. See note 18 supra.
77. See ILO GB Doc. 191/20/35; also Rossillion, ILO Examination of Human
Rights Situations: New Procedures for Special Surveys on Discrimination, INT'L
COMM'N JURISTS REV. 40-49 (June 1974).
78. For a detailed comparative analysis of the two Covenants and of the corre-
sponding international labor conventions and recommendations, see 52 [LO OnF.
BULL. No. 2 (1969).
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Article 18 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights empowers the Economic and Social Council to make
arrangements with the specialized agencies in respect of their
reporting to it on the progress made in achieving the obser-
vance of the Covenant's provisions falling within the scope of
their activities. In 1976 the Council called on the agencies to
respond under this provision with any relevant "decisions and
recommendations" by their "competent organs." The Gov-
erning Body asked the Committee of Experts on the Applica-
tion of Conventions and Recommendations to assume this
new responsibility. During the past three years the Committee
examined information concerning twenty-seven countries
(covering the right to work, the right to just and favorable
conditions of work, trade union rights, and the right to social
security) and reported its findings to ECOSOC.7 9 Considera-
tion of these findings by a "sessional working group" of the
Council started in the spring of 1980.
In the case of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
the Human Rights Committee responsible for implementation
has no formal cooperative arrangement with the specialized
agencies, but it has recognized the need to receive from them
all possible information relevant to its work.80
In the field of discrimination, collaboration between the
UN on the one hand and the ILO and UNESCO on the other
dates back to 1972. The UN committee entrusted with the su-
pervision of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Racial Discrimination regularly exchanges information with
the two agencies.8 1 The ILO and UNESCO have also coordi-
nated the two procedures for monitoring compliance with
their own instruments in this field, the Discrimination (Em-
ployment and Occupation) Convention and the Convention
against Discrimination in Education.2
79. See Second Report by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Con-
ventions and Recommendations of the International Labour Organization on Progress
in Achieving Observance of the Provisions of Articles 6 to 9 of the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Report of the Economic and Social
Council, U.N. Doc. No. E/1979/33 (1979). This report has an introductory section
defining the "approach adopted by the Committee," id. at 12-13.
80. See ILO GB Doc. 211/16/26 at 9 (1979).
81. See 1973 RCE, supra note 8, at 11-12; and, most recently, 1980 RCE, supra
note 8, at 9.
82. See, e.g., 1973 RCE, supra note 8, at 11; 1975 RCE, supra note 8, at 7.
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Council of Europe
The two major regional instruments on labor and social
policy adopted by the Council both specifically provide for an
ILO role in verifying compliance. The European Social Char-
ter, which is comprehensive in scope, contains supervisory ar-
rangements largely patterned on the ILO system.83 The Char-
ter provides for an ILO representative to take part in a
consultative capacity in the deliberations of the Committee of
Independent Experts, the technical body responsible for su-
pervision. This institutionalized participation has been func-
tioning since the Charter became effective in 1965.
The other major instrument, the European Code of Social
Security, goes even further in integrating the procedures of
the two organizations. Since it is based on the ILO convention
concerning minimum standards of social security (with provi-
sion in a Protocol for higher regional levels of coverage and
benefit), it entrusts the technical examination of government
reports to the competent ILO organ, i.e. again the Committee
of Experts, which has been performing this "outside" task
since 1969.84
In terms of human rights protection, the Council of Eu-
rope has the most highly developed body of standards and
compliance procedures. It remains to be seen whether the
ILO's cooperation will eventually be sought by other regional
groupings, though not necessarily along the same lines fol-
lowed in Strasbourg.
THE KEY ELEMENTS OF ILO ACTION
The ILO's compliance procedures differ from those of
other organizations not only by the uniqueness of their con-
text but also by the interaction of a variety of mechanisms.
Yet despite its operational complexity, the ILO system, as
sketched out here has been functioning on an increasingly ex-
tensive scale and with some measure of success. In conclusion,
it may be useful to sum up the characteristics that made this
83. See Valticos, Mise en parallele des actions et des mecanismes de controle
au niveau du Conseil de l'Europe et de l'Organisation internationale du Travail,
1978 LA CHARTE SOCIALE EUROPEENNE 238-65.
84. In 1978, for instance, the Committee of Experts "noted with great interest
the measures taken by certain of the States concerned with a view to ensuring the full
application" of the Code and its Protocol. 1978 RCE, supra note 8, at 9.
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possible and the factors that helped shape the ILO's proce-
dures, particularly over the past few years.
Tripartite Structure. The full-scale involvement of work-
ers' and employers' representatives in the adoption and impli-
mentation of international labor standards has left its mark
on the character and potential of the procedures.
Combination of Expert and Mutual Supervision. The
regular examination of reports by a body of independent ex-
perts and the regular dialogue with governments in a standing
tripartite committee of the International Labor Conference
have recently been supplemented by direct on-the-spot con-
tacts to explore difficulties and assist governments.
Interplay of Regular and Complaints Procedures. Com-
plaints under the constitution and the freedom of association
machinery are kept in reserve, should the regular supervision
mechanism prove to be unavailable or unable to deal with se-
rious violations.
Access to ILO Procedures. While complaints can only be
filed by governments, by employers' and workers' organiza-
tions, or by Conference delegates, the complainants are free to.
submit evidence obtained from other reliable quarters,
whether or not they are connected with the ILO.as
Cooperation with Other Human Rights Procedures. Ar-
rangements between the ILO and other international organi-
zations are designed to ensure a maximum of coordination
and mutual support, so that the wider human rights effort can
proceed along parallel lines and on all possible fronts."'
Evolution of ILO Procedures. In a continuing attempt to
adapt the operation of the system to new needs and ex-
panding tasks, a series of steps have had to be taken over the
past decade or two:
(a) routine reporting by governments has been simplifed
and efforts have been made to accelerate the examination of
85. The documentation submitted in support of the representation against
Czechoslovakia had been prepared by Professor Jiri Hajek who was Foreign Minister
in the Dubcek government in 1968. See note 51 supra. One of the freedom of associa-
tion complaints against the USSR drew on material supplied by Amnesty Interna-
tional. See note 64 supra; ILO GB Doc. 209/6/6 at 75 (1979).
86. The House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Organiza-
tions and Movements had gone a step further, in 1974, when it suggested that "the
ILO methods of protecting human rights should be emulated by other international
organizations," HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: A CALL FOR U.S. LEADER-
SHIP, 93rd CONG., 2d SESS. 45 (1974).
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serious violations;
(b) methods have been diversified, ranging from judicial
inquiries to quiet diplomacy and from formal complaints to
ad hoc procedures;
(c) new means of persuasion have been introduced,
through direct discussion with governments and through the
Conference Committee's highlighting of major cases of non-
compliance.
OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE
Although the late Senator Hubert Humphrey once called
the ILO's system "the most effective human rights mechanism
among international institutions, 8 7 the operational and other
problems the ILO faces are no less formidable then those con-
fronting other procedures. Principal among these has been the
need to maintain the momentum of supervision and to avoid
undue delays.88 Another major problem is the question of
politicization, reflecting world tensions, and the diversity of
ideologies and regimes around the globe."' Now that the
United States is back in the ILO, its government, employers'
and workers' spokesmen are again able not only to participate
actively in the organization's compliance procedures but also
to help counter any attempts to undermine their
effectiveness.90
87. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS-LAW AND PRACTICE 189 (J. Tuttle ed. 1978).
88. In the words of a recent article, "The unfortunate truism that the wheels of
justice grind slowly applies to the ILO process of accountability." Ziskind, Pursuit of
Justice Through the ILO, 3 CoMP. LAB. L. 66 (1979).
89. See The ILO: A Slow Struggle Toward Common Goals, ViEWPOINT, Winter,
1979, at 9-13.
90. In his address to the June 1980 International Labor Conference, the first
since the United States resumed ILO membership, Secretary of Labor Marshall un-
derlined this point:
We must not allow the work of the Conference to be diverted by the
extraneous political issues nor permit its machinery to be diverted from
supervising international labor standards or to be dismantled .... The
ILO can take justifiable pride in the fact that, along with its interna-
tional labor standards, it has developed supervisory and complaint ma-
chinery that is both impartial and effective.
Provisional Record (No. 14), supra note 24, at 8.
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